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**O**perations

**REPORT**

**PSYCHOLOGICAL  
OPERATIONS by  
USAF/VNAF in SVN**

**16 SEPTEMBER 1968**

**HQ PACAF**

**Directorate, Tactical Evaluation  
CHECO Division**

**Prepared by: Major D. R. Smith Project CHECO 7th AF, DOAC**

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366TFW ..... 1 Cy  
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483TAW ..... 1 Cy  
553RECON WG ..... 1 Cy  
6400 TEST SQ ..... 1 Cy  
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FOREWORD

This study summarizes the U.S. Air Force and Vietnamese Air Force's activities and achievements in Psychological Operations in Southeast Asia, primarily from 1965 to July 1968. Activities covered in "Psychological Operations" support national and local programs, principally by means of leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts in airborne operations. Strategy and campaigns include in-country operations in the Corps Tactical Zones and out-country areas. An analytical appraisal is provided of resource capabilities and effectiveness of operations, with recommendations illustrating how Psychological Operations may be used to greater advantage.

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# BASIC ORGANIZATION FOR PSYOP IN VIETNAM




FIGURE 1

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## INTRODUCTION

### Background

Responsibility for developing Psychological Operations programs is delegated to the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). These programs are put into effect through the U.S. Military Assistance Command's Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD) and Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (MACCORDS). The role of the USAF and VNAF is largely airborne support of psyops campaigns by means of loudspeaker and leaflet operations. These in-country campaigns are directed toward the South Vietnamese people, Viet Cong, and NVA forces. The out-country campaigns are directed toward the North Vietnamese people and the NVA infiltrators in Laos. Major psyops campaigns have been partially responsible for a defection rate equal to approximately one-third of the total enemy killed in combat operations and large desertion rates in the NVA infiltrators. The intensity of the psyops effort has been steadily increasing as the effectiveness of psychological operations becomes better understood. Airborne operations account for a major part of the in-country effort and virtually all of the out-country effort. The program in North Vietnam has been hampered by the cessation of operations above the 20th Parallel.

### Psyops Process

The term Psychological Operations, as interpreted in this study implies use of propaganda to achieve a desired political or military objective in a selected target group of people. As defined in USA FM 33-1, propaganda is: <sup>1/</sup>

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*"Any information, ideas, doctrines or special persuasion in support of national objectives, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specific group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly."*

To successfully achieve a psyops objective requires an understanding of the behavior of the target group, and knowledge of the means by which their behavior can be changed.<sup>2/</sup>

#### Nature of Conflict

The war in Vietnam is unlike either the Korean War or World War II. The enemy does not resort to traditional military tactics, but depends, almost exclusively, upon the use of guerrilla tactics. He operates on a hit-and-run basis and fades into the civilian population who provide him with protection, either because of sympathy with his cause, or fear of reprisal. Thus, there are normally no territorial boundaries defining friendly and enemy locations. The enemy cannot always be positively identified by his appearance, size, or location. Indeed, he has even exploited, to the fullest extent, the sanctuary provided by international boundaries.<sup>3/</sup>

Unfortunately, in his use of guerrilla tactics, the enemy has been aided by the weak nationalism displayed by the people of South Vietnam. Creation of national loyalty and unity in the South Vietnamese people has been hindered by a variety of factors: the diversity of the various ethnic groups comprising the population; their varied religious characteristics; their geographical orientation; and the instability that has existed in the government. The enemy has capitalized on this weakness to satisfy his requirement

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for people and logistics. In this manner, he has managed to maintain an ever-increasing flow of people and equipment from the North despite poor communications and difficult transportation routes. <sup>4/</sup>

The same situation, which has proved such a fertile field for enemy exploitation, has also provided equal opportunity for psywar operations by the Free World Forces. The same strengths and weaknesses in the people of South Vietnam are being exploited more and more by the Allies, as the effectiveness of Psychological Operations becomes more clearly understood and recognized. <sup>5/</sup>

#### Overview of USAF/VNAF Psyops

The U.S. Air Force became actively engaged in Psychological Operations in Vietnam after the buildup of U.S. troops in 1965. The Vietnamese Air Force preceded this by a year, when they received psyops responsibilities in connection with the formation of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) by the Vietnamese government. <sup>6/</sup> The principal role of both the USAF and VNAF has been the airborne support of Psychological Operations. Civic action programs are carried out by both forces; however, the USAF/VNAF civic action roles are only a minor part of the overall civic action program, as discussed in "USAF Civic Action in RVN", 1 April 1968. <sup>7/</sup>

Aircraft with loudspeaker systems were given to the VNAF in 1964. They have supported psyops activities, since that time by means of leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts. Due to limitations in the amount and quality of equipment, the VNAF has been able to support only about 10 percent of the

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overall in-country airborne psyops effort. <sup>8/</sup>

The USAF has supported Psychological Operations in South Vietnam and Laos with leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts since 1965. Leaflet drops into North Vietnam were started later the same year and have continued ever since. Until recently, much of the logistical support of the leaflet operations, where the leaflets are printed by offshore sources, was performed by the USAF; however, increased use is being made of surface shipment whenever time permits. <sup>9/</sup>

The effectiveness of the Psychological Operations performed by the military forces has been difficult to assess. Feedback of results is scarce, slow, and difficult to interpret. Perhaps a representative measure of our overall psyops success is given by the number of enemy who have defected to the Republic of Vietnam, under the Chieu Hoi program described later in the text. In 1967, there were 27,178 defectors (called "ralliers"), which, on the basis of a kill ratio of 4 to 1, represents a potential saving of more than 6,700 allied lives. The number of ralliers is also an impressive figure, <sup>10/</sup> when compared to the total enemy killed in 1967 of about 90,000. Although the validity of this comparison can be argued, it does indicate the significance of psyops efforts, particularly, in view of the relative expenditure put forth to achieve the two statistics. Clearly, the importance of Psychological Operations to the enemy is evidenced by the emphasis that he places on propaganda and counter-propaganda activities.

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## CHAPTER I

### PSYWAR PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

#### Early History

As early as April 1962, U.S. advisors in psychological warfare were introduced into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Instructors from the U.S. Army, Pacific, were sent to assist in developing the psychological training program within the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF). The U.S. activities were expanded slightly in February 1962, when the first Psywar Mobile Training Team (MTT) arrived. Since an integrated psychological warfare program did not exist within the RVN governmental structure, U.S. efforts were limited to advice, assistance, and training of RVNAF personnel.<sup>1/</sup>

During the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, very rigid control was exercised by the government over psyops, which severely limited all activities. However, after the 1 November coup d'etat, a marked change occurred in the attitude of the RVNAF toward psychological warfare. Propaganda schools and training centers began to pattern their programs after U.S. schools.<sup>2/</sup> In 1964, five U.S. Mobile Training Teams were sent to the RVN. The MTT provided assistance in radio management, Viet Cong (VC) propaganda research, printing management and production, psyops instruction, and motion picture production management.<sup>3/</sup>

During May 1964, the Inspector General of the GVN Civil Guard, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Le, returned from Taipei, where he had studied the political warfare program of the Republic of China. Impressed with their organization and structure, he recommended a "Special Commissariat for Psywar" be

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established. This agency, he suggested, should combine Psywar, the Military Security Service, Social Service, Veterans Affairs, and Chaplains organizations. <sup>4/</sup>

Essentially following the suggestions of General Le, Prime Minister Khanh established the General Political Welfare Department (GPWD) in November 1964. To help in this endeavor, advisors had been sent by the United States and the Republic of China. Unfortunately, the early development and effectiveness of the GPWD were hampered by changes in the government and problems of organization. This situation was greatly improved when, in July 1965, Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, by Decree Nr. 152, confirmed the GPWD as an integral part of the governmental structure under the armed forces. He placed under GPWD the responsibility for Political Indoctrination, Psywar, Social Services, Security, and Chaplain activities. <sup>5/</sup>

The psywar program under GPWD was formulated in terms of three objectives:

- Troop Action--to strengthen and maintain the fighting spirit and loyalty of the forces.
- Enemy Action--to destroy the spirit and will of the VC to fight.
- Civic Action--to gain the support and loyalty of the civilian population.

To support these objectives, several special programs were initiated in each of the action areas. Under Troop Actions, a political indoctrination program was formulated to instill a sense of responsibility, honor, and loyalty to the government in the military forces. A dependent welfare program was started, principally aimed at improving dependent housing. A PX-Commissary program was initiated, as well as a social welfare program providing benefits

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such as maternity care, welfare assistance, schools, and improved sanitation. To assist in improving troop morale, an awards program was initiated to provide recognition for meritorious service; and, finally, a program to provide troop entertainment was started. <sup>6/</sup>

In the area of Enemy Actions, the Chieu Hoi Safe Conduct Program that had been started under Diem, was greatly expanded. Included in the new program was a reorientation of the returnees, which not only included political indoctrination, but provisions for vocational training and resettlement. Another addition to the program was an awards campaign, which offered rewards for turning in enemy weapons. <sup>7/</sup>

Under Civic Actions, leaflet and loudspeaker programs were established for the indoctrination and education of the people to aid in acquainting them with their government. An indemnification program for damages and losses due to combat operations was initiated. Finally, hamlet aid programs were formulated to provide such items as medical care, gifts, repairs, and reconstruction. <sup>8/</sup>

#### Expansion of U.S. Involvement

Early in 1965, the Honorable Carl T. Rowan, Director, U.S. Information Agency, conducted an investigation of the informational and psychological warfare programs in South Vietnam. The results, summarized in a memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson, dated 16 March 1965, stressed that two major problems existed in the psyops program at that time. These were: <sup>9/</sup> (1) A lack of unified control and direction for psyops activities; and (2) The

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amount of investment in psyops was not commensurate with that of other fields.

The President's response, contained in National Security Action Memorandum Nr. 330, dated 9 April 1965, was to approve the recommendations of Mr. Rowan and delegate the authority to execute and coordinate an expanded program to the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, subject to the political guidance of the Secretary of State. The Minister of Public Affairs, Saigon, was given the overall responsibility and authority for coordination and direction of the entire Psychological Warfare Program in South Vietnam. <sup>10/</sup> Mr. Rowan's <sup>11/</sup> recommendations stated:

*"The USIA would not assume operational jurisdiction over the psywar offices serving with combat units; it would remain with the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. However, the officers would receive general direction from the Mission Psyops Committee, chaired by Mr. Barry Zorthian and guidance from the Field Services Center."*

From this stipulation emerged the current Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Saigon, which had Mr. Zorthian as its director. (Fig. 2.) JUSPAO <sup>12/</sup> was created in May 1965, by U.S. Embassy Instruction VN 186 to:

- Increase the Vietnamese people's participation in their government in the war against communist subversion and aggression.
- Increase Vietnamese participation in developing Vietnam's social and economic progress and its unity as a nation within the Free World Community, including acquainting the Vietnamese with American society.
- Increase other nations' sympathy and assistance for the cause of Vietnam.

Even prior to the buildup of U.S. forces in 1965, when the only U.S. military participation in South Vietnam was vested in a small advisory group,

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# JOINT UNITED STATES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE





FIGURE 2

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the psywar efforts in tactical support of field forces were directed by the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV or MACV). In May 1965, a Political Warfare Advisory Directorate within MACV was established to centralize the direction of the psywar support provided to the GPWD. This directorate was renamed in 1966, the Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD). <sup>13/</sup> With the expansion of U.S. combat troops in 1965, the 6th Psyop Battalion was delegated responsibility for providing tactical psyops support. On 1 January 1968, the battalion was expanded into the 4th Psyop Group. This group currently has a battalion stationed in each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) with the Field Forces. The deployment is as follows: <sup>14/</sup>



As might be expected, difficulties arose early between the various agencies engaged in political and Psychological Operations as to the delegation of specific responsibilities. An attempt had been made to clarify the relationship between JUSPAO and other psywar agencies in a joint JUSPAO/MACV message on 18 May 1965: <sup>15/</sup>

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*"All members of the U.S. Mission concerned with psychological programs will receive substantive direction, technical supervision and support from the Director JUSPAO."*

In spite of the guidance, misunderstandings continued throughout 1966 and 1967, until Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then MACV Commander, delineated the following organizational responsibilities: <sup>16/</sup>

- JUSPAO retains the responsibility for policy guidance and coordination to give direction to the Psychological Operations effort.
- MACV will be responsible for the execution of Psychological operations in the field. They will take over printing of all tactical leaflets including those for North Vietnam. The contents of leaflets are subject to approval by a MACV/Embassy/JUSPAO policy committee. JUSPAO will continue to produce tactical tapes for loudspeaker use in support of military operations and the Chieu Hoi Program.
- Within MACV, MACPD will be responsible for tactical psychological warfare in support of military operations against enemy units including the Chieu Hoi Program. MACCORDS (MACV Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) will be responsible for psychological operations in support of pacification and national development activities.

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## CHAPTER II

### STRATEGY AND CAMPAIGNS

#### Psyops Targets

Psychological operations in Vietnam and Laos have been directed through five major target groups:

RVN Population

Viet Cong

NVN Infiltrators

NVN Population

Ethnic Laotian.

The low literacy ratio and inadequate communications cause the people of South Vietnam to have a poor understanding of the GVN and the role of the Allied Forces in Vietnam. Every available method of contact has been used to better inform and educate them. Major civic action and pacification programs have been established through MACCORDS and through the Free World Military Forces. Airborne Psychological Operations have been performed by the VNAF and USAF in support of these programs. These have principally taken the form of leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts which: (1) present general political propaganda; (2) warn of impending airstrikes, herbicide missions, and insecticide missions; (3) provide information on current events; (4) explain welfare and reimbursement programs; and the like. The goal of these efforts has been to improve the sympathy and support of the people for the government. <sup>1/</sup>

Since the Viet Cong have their origin in the South Vietnamese people, some of the efforts directed at the general populace are effective with the VC. In

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addition, specific propaganda programs have been established which attempt to discredit the propaganda from North Vietnam and exploit every opportunity for inducing the VC troops to abandon the Communist cause and return to the GVN. The thematic content of this propaganda has been directed at weaknesses in the VC life:

- Hardships and dangers of combat.
- Separation of the VC from his family.
- Lies and unfilled promises by the NVN leaders.
- Better life he might expect under the GVN.

Much of the psyops material distributed has been devoted to the means by which the VC could safely defect and return to the Government. <sup>2/</sup>

Propaganda directed at the NVN infiltrators has been distributed along known routes of infiltration in Laos and Vietnam, as well as throughout South Vietnam, wherever there are suspected concentrations of NVN troops. The thematic content of the psyops material has been pointed toward creating doubt, despair, hopelessness, and fear. Materials disseminated have emphasized known weaknesses and superstitions in an effort to induce defection and desertion in the NVA troops or, at least, reduce their effectiveness. <sup>3/</sup>

As early as 1965, efforts were started to convey the psychological warfare campaign to the people of North Vietnam, by means of radio broadcasts and large scale leaflet drops. Emphasis has been placed on the creation of doubt in the people regarding NVN propaganda by providing true information on current events in Vietnam and around the world, and information on the intent of the

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South Vietnamese Government and Free World Forces. <sup>4/</sup>

### Psyops Campaigns

The Psychological Operations involving the distribution of propaganda through leaflets and loudspeaker operations can be classified in two categories: strategic and tactical. Tactical psyops are formulated locally to exploit local tactical situations. They are frequently of a "Quick Reaction" nature to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. To achieve these objectives, the psyops resources are under the direction of the local Field Force Commander; however, he must operate within the guidance of JUSPAO. Strategic psyops are concerned with major campaigns formulated to achieve national objectives and are under the direction of JUSPAO. An exception to this is the psyops program in Laos, which utilizes material generated from JUSPAO/MACV and material produced by a Controlled American Source (CAS). The overall Laotian program is supervised by the U.S. Embassy in Laos. Frequently, the materials developed under the strategic campaigns are utilized in the tactical corps operations. By the same token, a Quick Reaction capability is maintained in the out-country program in North Vietnam. <sup>5/</sup>

### Chieu Hoi Program

The theme of the Chieu Hoi Program is based on offers of forgiveness and good treatment to enemy troops that defect to the GVN. Its origin stems from the 14th Century, when the Vietnamese were engaged in a struggle with the Ming dynasty of China. King Le Loi of the Vietnamese offered an amnesty to certain civil prisoners, if they would assist in the struggle. Included in the offer was a phrase similar to "Chieu Hoi", which is a combination of

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the verbs "to welcome" and "to return". King Le Loi was successful in his war with China and the victory is celebrated on the 22d day of the eighth Lunar month (late September). <sup>6/</sup>

President Diem inaugurated the Chieu Hoi Program on 17 April 1963. It was formulated around a similar idea used in the Philippines and Malaya. The program offered amnesty, repatriation, and resettlement for VC if they "rallied" to the Republic of Vietnam. <sup>7/</sup>

Initially successful in 1963, the program later floundered due to a lack of interest on the part of government officials. Unfortunately, the program was associated with Diem and became politically unpopular after his overthrow. However, it was saved by Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky who reorganized and reemphasized it in 1965. <sup>8/</sup> Until recently, it was the major psyops campaign in Vietnam. Currently the program against the NVA is a slightly larger effort. <sup>9/</sup> The overall effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi Program is demonstrated by the following summary of ralliers ("Hoi Chanh") by year since 1963: <sup>10/</sup>


<u>Year</u>	<u>Ralliers</u>
1963	11,248
1964	5,417
1965	11,124
1966	20,242
1967	27,178

Initially, the thematic content of the Chieu Hoi Program was directed toward the Viet Cong and attempted to exploit his innate fears, the hardships of VC life, and nostalgia for his family. The young VC has a fear of being

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# GIẤY THÔNG-HÀNH



SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES

이 안전보장패소는 월남정부와 모든 연합군에 의해 인정된 것입니다.

รัฐบาลเวียดนามและหน่วยพันธมิตร ยินดีให้เกียรติแก่ผู้ถือบัตรผ่านปลอดภัยนี้.

Side 1

SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES

## MANG TÂM GIẤY THÔNG HÀNH

này về cộng tác với Chính Phủ  
Quốc Gia các bạn sẽ được :

- Đón tiếp tử tế
- Bảo đảm an ninh
- Đãi ngộ tương xứng

  
NGUYỄN VĂN THIỆU  
Tổng Thống Việt Nam Cộng Hoà



TẤM GIẤY THÔNG HÀNH NÀY CÓ GIÁ TRỊ VỚI TẤT CẢ CƠ - QUAN  
QUÂN CHÍNH VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA VÀ LỰC-LƯỢNG ĐỒNG-MINH.

Side 2

Passport (Safe Conduct Pass)  
Figure 3

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drafted, which is used to induce him to hide from draft teams, or rally to the GVN. He has a religious fear, which has frequently been used to good advantage: his body will be abandoned on the battlefield and not receive a prior funeral. It is his nostalgia for his family and home, however, that has been the primary motivation for rallying in the majority of cases. <sup>11/</sup>

Upon rallying to the GVN, the "Hoi Chanh" is retained in a Chieu Hoi village for 60 days where he receives two new suits, 1,000 piastres, political reorientation, and vocational training, if desired. He is interrogated and frequently provides useful intelligence information. <sup>12/</sup>

After his stay in the Chieu Hoi village, the rallier is released, preferably to return to his home district as a member of an armed propaganda team. There he resumes his usual occupation, or utilizes his new vocational training, and serves as an example of the Chieu Hoi Program and of the GVN. <sup>13/</sup>

Approximately 20 percent of the ralliers, for one reason or another, do not wish to return home, preferring to join the GVN forces. In a few limited cases, specially selected ralliers are chosen to be trained for a group called the "Kit Carson Scouts". These scouts serve with ARVN and U.S. units as guides in VC territory. <sup>14/</sup>

#### NVA In-Country

When it was discovered in 1965 that NVA troops were infiltrating into South Vietnam, a propaganda campaign was initiated in-country directed at these troops. The propaganda not only plays upon their fears and superstitions, but stresses the use of Safe Conduct Passes and the good treatment they will

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receive if they defect. <sup>15/</sup> With the buildup of enemy troops in 1967, and the heavy losses during Tet early in 1968, the concentration of NVA troops in the enemy forces has become so great that this program campaign currently represents the major psyops effort in South Vietnam. In addition to the heavy use of strategic leaflets, including safe conduct passes, locally produced leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts are used to exploit tactical situations where heavy pressure is being exerted on the enemy. <sup>16/</sup>

#### ARC LIGHT

The B-52 strikes, in-country and out-country, have a major psychological effect upon enemy troops. Within four hours after B-52 missions, leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts are performed by psywar aircraft in the target and surrounding areas over which the bomb blast noise would have been clearly heard. Warnings are given of other strikes coming, and it is suggested that these strikes can be avoided by surrendering and rallying to the GVN.

#### ELEPHANT WALK Campaign

A campaign was initiated in June 1968 to offer rewards for information on the location of allied prisoners or aid in their release. The enemy has detention camps located throughout South Vietnam, and the program is an attempt to enlist the aid of the South Vietnamese in locating and rescuing prisoners. The following rewards are offered for: <sup>18/</sup>

- Rescue and return of allied personnel ..... 600,000\$VN
- Giving information which enables the ARVN or U.S. Forces to effect a rescue ..... 60,000\$VN

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- Providing information on the location of allied prisoners, upon verification ..... 18,000\$VN

#### TRAIL Campaign

This campaign is the out-country program against NVA infiltrators. It was initiated in January 1966, and has gradually increased in intensity since that time. It consists principally of leaflet and loudspeaker operations directed at way stations, staging and supply areas, and the routes and trails leading to these areas, which are located in North Vietnam, the Laotian Panhandle, the Laos-RVN Border areas and the Cambodian-RVN Border areas. Thematic content is designed to create fear, anxiety, and insecurity in the NVA soldiers on their way to South Vietnam, in order to cause defection, desertion and a loss of effectiveness in the units. One particular TRAIL leaflet, "The Soldiers Poem", has been found to have a great impact on the NVA troops. <sup>19/</sup>

#### FRANTIC GOAT Campaign

This campaign, originally called FACT SHEET, was established by JUSPAO on 2 April 1965, in an attempt to carry the propaganda programs directly to the people of North Vietnam. Initially, the program was designed to convince the North Vietnamese that the Free World Forces would continue to increase the attacks against North Vietnam, unless their support of the insurgencies in Laos and South Vietnam was stopped. Since its inception, the program has been redirected and expanded toward educating and informing the North Vietnamese people of the actual progress of the war and the intentions of the GVN and Free World Forces. It is hoped that this information will aid in

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discrediting Communist claims, and convince the people that they are being exploited by their leaders.<sup>20/</sup> The FRANTIC GOAT operations have been hampered through lack of a psyop system, which can penetrate the high threat areas in North Vietnam, and distribute large numbers of leaflets to the people.<sup>21/</sup>

#### Other Campaigns

Leaflet and airborne loudspeaker operations have been used in miscellaneous roles; such as, warnings of insecticide and herbicide missions; support of elections and celebrations; warnings of air defense trails; instructions to personnel off-base during enemy attacks and the like.<sup>22/</sup>


A small campaign has been conducted in the Demilitarized Zone, including the region called TALLY HO. The material is directed at laborers working along lines of communications and military facilities in the southern part of North Vietnam. Attempts are made to exploit the air attacks by warnings of additional attacks coming and suggestions that the laborers leave and not risk their lives.<sup>23/</sup>

A high security classification precludes inclusion, in this report of other psywar campaigns conducted by the U.S. Government.<sup>24/</sup>

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# 14th ACW PSYOP AIRCRAFT DEPLOYMENT



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FIGURE 4

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## CHAPTER III

### USAF PSYOPS

#### In-Country Psyops

The 14th Air Commando Wing, under operational control of Seventh Air Force, is responsible for all in-country support of psywar activities of the U.S. Air Force. This support is provided by the 5th and 9th Air Commando Squadrons. (Fig. 4.) <sup>1/</sup> The first direct support role of the USAF in Psychological Operations in Vietnam began after the buildup of U.S. combat troops in 1965. During the last quarter of that year, the 5th Air Commando Squadron (ACS) was deployed there. PCS personnel for this unit began arriving in November, and by the end of 1965, fifty-four personnel had reported for duty.

The first four aircraft, C-47 "Gooney Birds", arrived at Nha Trang Air Base, Vietnam, between 19 and 21 August; these were flown and maintained by TDY personnel from the 1st Air Commando Wing (ACW) at Hurlburt Field, Florida. On 20 November, the 5th ACS received four U-10 aircraft, which had been re-assigned from Bien Hoa Air Base. On 19 November, seventeen U-10 aircraft were unloaded at the Saigon Port, with three more arriving three weeks later. A fifth C-47 was also received in December. These aircraft were equipped with loudspeaker systems and immediately were used in support of Psychological Operations. <sup>2/</sup>

The 5th ACS was placed under the operational control of the 6253d Combat Support Group, which was redesignated the 14th Air Commando Wing, early in 1966. The mission of the 5th ACS was: <sup>3/</sup>

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*"Conduct psychological operations in response to the needs of PSYOPS agencies in-country by loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet dissemination, transport of psy-ops printed matter and psyops personnel; conduct civic actions, humanitarian programs and other activities in support of USAF, PACAF, MACV and JUSPAO as required."*

The first major operation, supported from 9-20 January 1966, by the 5th ACS, was Tet. Inadequate resources were available for the level of effort desired, so four HC/C-47s and 12 U-10s were borrowed from other squadrons. During the 12-day period, 1,346 hours and 559 missions were flown. Nine aircraft hits were encountered with one man wounded. More than 130 million leaflets were dropped and 380 hours of airborne loudspeaker time were performed. At that time, the operation represented the largest psyops program ever carried out by U.S. forces overseas. <sup>4/</sup>

The squadron continued to support psyops programs in each of the Corps throughout 1966 and early 1967. The 5th ACS aircraft deployment reported in October 1966 was: <sup>5/</sup>

<u>Location</u>	<u>O-2B</u>	<u>C-47</u>	<u>CTZ</u>
Da Nang	2	0	I
Pleiku	3	0	II
Nha Trang	5	6	II
Bien Hoa	2	0	III
Bin Thuy	2	0	IV

In March 1967, the 9th Air Commando Squadron was formed from resources of the 5th Air Commando Squadron. It was equipped with six C-47s and 20 new O-2B aircraft. Until the arrival of the latter in May, the 9th ACS borrowed

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U-10s already deployed in their support area. Psywar support was divided between the 5th ACS and 9th ACS by Corps Tactical Zone, with the 5th ACS retaining III and IV CTZ, and the 9th ACS taking over responsibility for I and II CTZ. <sup>6/</sup>

#### Psywar Mission Requirements

Requirements for psywar missions are derived from two sources associated with the strategic and tactical division of responsibilities. Tactical requirements are generated locally by Province Chiefs or Field Force units and are submitted to the CTZ psyop battalion. The battalion, through a psywar board, reviews these requirements for redundancy and establishes a priority to each. The compilation is forwarded to the supporting Air Commando Squadron a week in advance, if possible, to allow weekly mission planning. Provision is made for updating of the requirements until the day preceding the mission. Quick Reaction missions are handled by placing one aircraft in every night flight on standby each day. The priority system has been initiated to allow optimum utilization of resources by applying the aircraft to the highest priorities, should the number of requested missions become too great to handle. This also allows a redistribution of resources, if one area gets a high priority program which is too big to handle locally. <sup>7/</sup>

Strategic requirements, although formulated nationally, are still submitted to the CTZ psyop battalions to be included with the compilation of local requirements. Local JUSPAO representatives maintain cognizance of the psyops mission planning and supervise the accomplishments of national objectives. <sup>8/</sup>

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### Resource Capabilities


The three types of aircraft used to support the in-country psyops effort, the U-10, O-2B, and the C-47 are equipped with a loudspeaker system for either live or taped airborne broadcasts. The C-47 uses an Altec speaker system (mounted aft of the rear door on left side, Fig. 7), with 1,000 watt capacity. The U-10s have a 1,000 watt Ling-Temco-Vaught University system. (Speaker is barely visible beneath wing, Fig. 5). <sup>9/</sup> The O-2Bs have an improved 1,800 watt speaker system (on right side of aircraft, Fig. 6), which provides them with the most powerful system in the inventory. <sup>10/</sup>

The varying operational characteristics, equipment capability, and navigational capability of these aircraft make them suitable for different type missions. Because of lower background aircraft noise and better maneuverability, the U-10 and O-2B are more useful for daytime speaker missions. The larger load capacity makes the C-47 more useful for leaflet drops. Night-time speaker operations and leaflet drops are performed by the C-47, due to inadequate navigational equipment and weather instruments in the U-10 and O-2B. In I and II Corps, the 9th ACS utilizes the C-47 for daytime leaflet drops and the O-2B for speaker operations almost exclusively. This division has not been as sharply defined in the 5th ACS. <sup>11/</sup>

Effective speaker operation has been achieved by flying the aircraft in about a two-kilometer radius around a central target. Early attempts to obtain area coverage were found to be ineffective as the speaker did not stay directed toward any one target long enough for the entire message to be heard. Currently, area coverage is obtained by dividing the area into several point

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
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U-10  
Figure 5

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0-2B  
Figure 6

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C-47  
Figure 7

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targets. Each point target is covered for approximately five to fifteen minutes with each tape. <sup>12/</sup>

Leaflet dispensing in the U-10 and O-2B must be done by hand and is limited by the load capacity of the aircraft. In the C-47, a chute has been installed in the rear floor of the cargo compartment which extends into the airstream. Leaflets are dispensed, a box at a time, by emptying the contents into a hopper at the top of the chute. A vacuum is created by the slipstream which draws the leaflets into the air. Care must be taken to allow for local wind conditions to prevent the leaflets drifting out of the target area. <sup>13/</sup>

#### Out-Country Psyops

Psychological Operations in areas outside of South Vietnam were started in 1965. The first mission into North Vietnam was flown in April 1965, <sup>14/</sup> and missions into Laos were begun in January 1966. <sup>15/</sup> Support of these operations has been provided from a variety of sources and can best be explained in terms of the two major out-country campaigns, FRANTIC GOAT and TRAIL.

#### FRANTIC GOAT Missions

The presence of heavy concentrations of antiaircraft fire and SAM sites in many regions of North Vietnam has required the use of fighter aircraft for leaflet distributions near these areas. Other regions can be reached by using a high altitude technique for wind drifting leaflets over large distances into targets in North Vietnam. The 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, using F-4C aircraft with the M129E1 leaflet bomb, performs missions requiring fighter aircraft for high-threat areas. The Wing is stationed at Ubon RTAFB, Thailand. Mission requirements are generated by JUSPAO/MACV and the sorties are

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fragged out of 7AF Headquarters at Tan Son Nhut. Most of these missions have been to the Red River Delta area, near Hanoi and Haiphong, where the majority of North Vietnamese people are located. Sorties to this area or above the 20th Parallel have been curtailed since late March 1968. <sup>16/</sup>

The high altitude leaflet drops are performed by C-130 aircraft stationed with the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) at Naha AFB, Okinawa. These aircraft normally are staged out of Ubon where a 374th (TAW) mission is located for their support. The fragging of missions is accomplished in the same manner used for the F-4C sorties. Usually, the mission uses leaflets printed at Okinawa; therefore, the C-130 brings a load with it to Ubon. As requirements for the number of leaflets to be dropped increased, it was found that better aircraft utilization could be obtained by prepositioning leaflets at Ubon and having the C-130 perform another sortie the next night. <sup>17/</sup>

#### TRAIL Operations

The requirements and material for the interdiction campaign in Laos comes from two origins, MACV/JUSPAO in Saigon and a Controlled American Source (CAS) in Laos. Since the material is being distributed in Laos, the U.S. Embassy there must approve all operations. The largest number of leaflets come from JUSPAO/MACV and are distributed from the eastern side by the 14th ACW and from the western side by the 374th TAW mission at Ubon. The 14th ACW usually accomplishes these missions with C-47 aircraft from the nearest ACS flight. The 374th TAW dispenses the TRAIL leaflets as an add-on to the BLINDBAT C-130 sorties. <sup>18/</sup> Material from the CAS is distributed from Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand, by the 56th Air Commando Wing under operational control

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Box Action on Static Line  
Figure 8

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of the 7/13th Air Force headquartered at Udorn. These operations consist of leaflet drops as well as loudspeaker broadcasts. The leaflet drops are accomplished in low-threat areas by means of U-10 aircraft of the 606th Air Commando Squadron and in higher-threat regions as an add-on to C-123 CANDLE-STICK missions from the same squadron.

### Resource Capabilities

Wind Drift: The accurate placement of leaflets dropped by an aircraft on a target has been the subject of much research ever since World War II. A variety of methods have been developed which allow deployment under different target conditions. The motion of leaflets and their dispersion have been found to be functions of many parameters including: leaflet size, weight, height of deployment, method of deployment, and local wind conditions. Much of this research is summarized in a draft report published by the 7th Psyop Group. <sup>20/</sup>

A primary outgrowth of this research has been the technique for high altitude dissemination of leaflets using the C-130 aircraft. The mission is complicated in this case by the necessity of the crew working in oxygen masks because of the extreme altitude. A special box is used to contain the leaflets. The box is cut and has webbing attached to a static line; when pushed out the rear of the aircraft, it hits the end of this line, spilling the contents into the airstream. (Fig. 8.) <sup>21/</sup> Storage of the leaflet boxes in the C-130 has been designed to minimize the physical effort required to handle them as they are dispensed. Special 4632 pallets are used, which have the boxes located on rollers, with an aisle down the middle for access. The pallets are located

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end-to-end, so that boxes can be rolled from one to another toward the rear of the cargo compartment. Five pallets can be loaded in this fashion, each of which contains 30 boxes, one level high. If the mission requires more than 150 boxes, a second tier is packed starting from the rear of the aircraft. Each box weighs about 140 pounds and only the second tier must be lifted.

To dispense the boxes, the aircraft is placed in a slightly nose-high altitude; the boxes are rolled to the rear of the aircraft with little or no effort; the static lines are attached to the static-line cable, and the boxes are pushed out one at a time. In this manner, the leaflet cargo can be deployed as rapidly as one box every 10 or 15 seconds. Qualified altitude chamber observers always accompany the crew to monitor their physical condition. 22/

Leaflet Bombs: The M129E1 leaflet bomb was developed to provide a capability for dispensing leaflets from high performance aircraft. Each bomb can carry about fifty thousand 8.5" by 3.2" leaflets; the actual number depends upon the leaflet size and weight. An F-4C can carry ten M129E1 bombs. When the bomb is released, a fuze functions at a preset time and detonates a primer cord, which shatters the two body sections and releases the leaflets at the desired altitude. 23/

Delayed Opening Leaflet System (DOLS): The C-130 BLINDBAT mission at Ubon and the 56th ACW U-10 and C-123 Squadrons at Nakhon Phanom use delayed opening techniques for dispensing leaflets. Groundfire, terrain, and localized targets require accurate placement of leaflets from several thousand feet

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
DOLS Loading  
Figure 9

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
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Flare Rack  
Figure 10

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Prepared DOLS  
Figure 11

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altitude. Greater accuracy is obtained by dropping the leaflets in a package that does not open, until it is about 500 feet above the ground. <sup>24/</sup>

Different DOLS techniques have been developed by personnel at Ubon and Nakhon Phanom. The BLINDBAT personnel have discovered a method of utilizing rejected flares, which can be very effectively deployed by the flare system in the BLINDBAT aircraft. These flares would normally be destroyed at the base. The DOLS is made by opening the end of the flare, removing the parachute, replacing the chute with leaflets and replacing the end cover. When the DOLS is dropped and the timer fires, the explosion, which would normally open the parachute, deploys the leaflets. Approximately two thousand 6"x3" leaflets can be placed in each DOLS. Since the DOLS has the same appearance as a normal flare, it is color coded to allow identification. The procedure for loading flares or DOLSS in the C-130 flare racks is shown in Figure 9, and Figure 10 shows the racks as they appear from the outside of the aircraft. A simple mechanical release is used to drop the flares or leaflets from the rack. One useful, but unforeseen, feature of this DOLS technique is that the flare candle is not removed and normally lights when the timer fires. When the flare hits the ground, it can usually be seen, showing whether the drop was on target or not. <sup>25/</sup>

The DOLS technique, developed by personnel of the 56th ACW, is a modification of previously used methods. It consists of a cardboard box that is cut to fall apart and retied with cord; an ignitor and a fuze are cut to an appropriate length to give the desired height of deployment. The cord holding the box together passes through a hole in the fuze. When the fuze

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burns through the cord, the box falls apart, releasing the contents. This has proved to be a simple, inexpensive, and reliable system. The boxes can even be procured locally. <sup>26/</sup> (Fig. 11.) Some concern has been expressed regarding the box size being excessive and deploying more leaflets than necessary. From 500 feet, the optimum size leaflet bundle should contain <sup>27/</sup> 250 to 500 leaflets.

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# HEADQUARTERS AND WING POLWAR ORGANIZATION




FIGURE 12

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## CHAPTER IV

### VNAF PSYOPS

#### Organization

The Vietnamese Air Force had its origin in 1951 as a part of the French Air Force. In 1955, it was separated and made an independent organization. The U.S. Air Force assumed an advisory mission to the VNAF in 1956. <sup>1/</sup>

The Vietnamese Air Force did not become involved in the performance and support of Psychological Operations, until the General Political Warfare Directorate was established in 1964. Psychological Operations have the same relationship in the VNAF as in the other forces and are incorporated in the field of Political Warfare (POLWAR). Many of the responsibilities and activities under POLWAR are much the same as the USAF classifies as "Personnel Services". They include: <sup>2/</sup>

- Political education and indoctrination;
- General education and information services;
- Psychological operations;
- Military civic action and civil affairs;
- Counter-intelligence and counter-espionage;
- Dependent welfare;
- Public information;
- Chaplain affairs;
- Troop entertainment;
- Physical education and military sports;
- Political warfare schools.


The political warfare organization in the VNAF consists of a staff at VNAF headquarters and at each Wing. The political warfare officer has direct responsibility to the Chief of Staff at VNAF Headquarters and to the Wing Commander at each Wing. (Fig. 12.) <sup>3/</sup>

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The USAF did not provide advisors in psychological warfare to the VNAF until 1966. Currently, the U.S. advisory group consists of two representatives at VNAF Headquarters at Tan Son Nhut Air Base and one at each Wing. <sup>4/</sup>

### Resources

The VNAF began airborne support of psyops activities in 1964, after receiving five U-6 and four U-17 aircraft equipped with 250-watt loudspeaker systems. These aircraft have been utilized for leaflet drops and speaker broadcasts. In addition, the O-1 has been used to deploy leaflets. <sup>5/</sup> (Figs. 13, 14, 15.) The current deployment of squadrons supporting psyops activities is: <sup>6/</sup>



The original 250-watt speaker systems installed in the VNAF aircraft were found to be effective only when operated at altitudes below 1,000 feet. At this altitude, the aircraft are very vulnerable to groundfire. With the gradual increase in enemy firepower, the speaker operations have become much

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
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U-6  
Figure 13

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
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U-17  
Figure 14

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0-1  
Figure 15

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more hazardous. At the present time, most speaker operations are performed with two U-6 aircraft that have been equipped with 1,000-watt speakers allowing operation up to 3,000 feet. Sixteen additional 1,000-watt speakers have been ordered for delivery during FY 69. Plans are to install four speaker systems each quarter. <sup>7/</sup>

#### Mission Requirements

VNAF airborne Psychological Operations since 1965 have accounted for approximately ten percent of the overall Air Force psyops effort in South Vietnam. They have conducted an average of approximately 250 - 300 sorties per month, which represents 40 - 60 million leaflets dropped and 100 - 125 loudspeaker hours performed. <sup>8/</sup>

Requirements for VNAF missions are generated in the same manner as for USAF sorties. The Corps Headquarters forwards requirements to the Tactical Operations Centers (TOC) and on to the Direct Air Support Centers (DASC) where the psyops sorties are fraggd. The DASC is cognizant of the capability and capacity of the various VNAF units and frags them accordingly. Remaining mission requirements are given to the USAF. Psyops sorties, to satisfy strategic requirements, are frequently fraggd by the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Tan Son Nhut, and are usually performed by the 716th Recon Squadron located there. Leaflets and tapes for these missions are provided by JUSPAO/MACV. For local or tactical missions, leaflet materials are usually picked up at the province capital and are then distributed. <sup>9/</sup>

A summary of the VNAF psyops missions since July 1966, is given in Appendix I. (Information on operations before that time is incomplete.) An indication of the support by CTZ is also given in Appendix I. As can be

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seen, the major support is provided by the 716th Recon Squadron at Tan Son Nhut. <sup>10/</sup>

#### Problem Areas

Effective utilization of psyops by the VNAF has been hampered by several factors. There has been a lack of adequate loudspeaker equipment. The increase in groundfire has seriously limited the use of the low-power speaker systems. The addition of the 16 higher-powered systems to the inventory next fiscal year will greatly improve the VNAF capability. <sup>11/</sup>

The RVNAF have never placed Psychological Operations on the same level of importance as that of U.S. officials. This is due in part to their organizational structure, which places psywar on the same level as social services, commissary, and chaplain activities. In addition, they have a large problem of indoctrination for their own troops. Opportunities for effectively utilizing Psychological Operations are not vigorously sought by the RVNAF. Indeed, even U.S. advisors have difficulty in gaining timely access to prisoners and ralliers. More emphasis on exploiting psywar opportunities by high ranking military leaders might improve the enthusiasm of RVNAF personnel for psyops activities. A further increase in the number of trained psyops personnel in the RVNAF might also improve the utilization of psyops opportunities, and improve the cooperation between RVNAF and U.S. forces. The gradual increase in the recognition of psyops potential by U.S. personnel, however, is being carried over to the RVNAF. <sup>12/</sup>

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## Civic Actions

VNAF participation in civic action programs stems primarily from a requirement to maintain a secure area around the air bases. Teams are sent into surrounding hamlets to carry out security inspections. At the same time, Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) services, welfare distributions, and repair programs are started to gain the confidence and support of the people. Presently, the VNAF participates in civic activities in about 37 hamlets. 13/

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## CHAPTER V

### APPRAISAL OF PSYOPS

#### Statistics

Statistics demonstrate the increase in emphasis placed on the in-country psyops efforts. In summarizing the monthly leaflets dropped in each of the Corps Tactical Zones, there were over four times as many dropped in 1967 as in 1966. Leaflets dropped in 1966 totaled 1,404,390 as compared with 5,806,683 dropped by the end of 1967. From January through May 1968, there were 3,141,246 leaflets dropped, which was more than twice the number dropped in the entire year of 1966. Loudspeaker air hours totaled 161,701 in 1967-- more than twice the total (64,375) in 1966. Sorties flown in each of the Corps Tactical Zones also showed increases in 1968 over those performed in 1967. <sup>1/</sup> (Appendix II.)

The psyops programs show a continual evolution as techniques are improved, more and better equipment becomes available, and more efficient utilization of resources is realized. As more highly trained personnel are placed in the field, a better understanding and recognition of psyops potential are realized. <sup>2/</sup>

Out-country operations into North Vietnam began in early 1965. By the end of the year, 77 million leaflets, 340,000 newspapers and 20,000 gift packages had been dispensed to the people. Appendix III summarizes the operations subsequent to 1965. In March 1968, along with the cessation of bombing in the northern part of North Vietnam, a restriction was placed on

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Psychological Operations which would place leaflets on the ground above the 20th Parallel. <sup>3/</sup>

The leaflet operations directed out of the MACV Psyop Directorate, which have been associated with the TRAIL Campaign in Laos, are summarized in Appendix IV. <sup>4/</sup> (These figures do not include the leaflet operations performed by the 56th ACW under the direction of the CAS in Laos, as incomplete statistics on this operation were available.) Since early 1967, however, operations of the 56th ACW have been conducted at a rate varying from several hundred thousand to one or two million leaflets per month. Only one or two loudspeaker missions were performed per month, and these operations were discontinued in February 1968, due to the danger of groundfire to the speaker aircraft. <sup>5/</sup>

Since the beginning of USAF participation in psyops missions in Vietnam, no personnel have been killed as a direct result of enemy action and no record of fatalities was discovered prior to that time. Two aircraft accidents have occurred in-country which resulted in the loss of personnel. On 7 June 1967, a U-10 crashed immediately after takeoff killing the pilot. The cause of the accident could not be determined. <sup>6/</sup> A midair collision occurred on 4 October 1967 between a U-10 and C-7 Caribou aircraft. The U-10 pilot was never found and is listed as missing in action. <sup>7/</sup>

Since psywar aircraft have received numerous hits during their missions, the absence of combat fatalities is notable. The 14th ACW has experienced more than 200 recorded hits on aircraft since 1965 from enemy groundfire. On

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several occasions, aircraft were forced to make emergency landings due to these hits. <sup>8/</sup> Thirteen Purple Hearts have been awarded personnel of the 14th ACW due to injuries received in action. <sup>9/</sup> The psywar mission, due to its nature, makes the aircraft particularly susceptible to groundfire. The missions are effective only if flown over enemy concentrations, and usually at altitudes which can be reached by small-arms fire. This is particularly true for the loudspeaker missions, where the aircraft must stay within speaker range of suspected enemy troops for long periods of time, while the message is being broadcasted. Early in the psywar program, there were tendencies for the enemy to withhold fire on the aircraft to prevent giving away their position; however, directions have been given recently to fire upon psywar aircraft. <sup>10/</sup>

In the out-country operations, only two instances of aircraft hits are attributed to psywar missions. Both of these occurred with U-10 aircraft from the 56th ACW at Nakhon Phanom. However, the BLINDBAT and CANDLESTICK operations draw heavy concentrations of groundfire. Since the psyops leaflet drops are only an add-on to these missions, any hits received are not attributed to the psyops missions. <sup>11/</sup>

#### Operational Problems

Part of the difficulties encountered in the efficient utilization of aircraft for psychological operations stems from the size, diversification, and complexity of the overall psychological warfare program in Vietnam. Historically, the psywar program developed from activities initiated by a variety of different sources: the province leaders, the civic action groups,

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the tactical forces, the national government, the U.S. Administration officials, and others. As outlined in Chapter I, the attempts to coordinate and consolidate these diverse efforts created confusion in responsibilities and an unwieldy organizational structure. There were frequent overlaps and cross purposes in the various missions requested. <sup>12/</sup> A continual improvement has been made in this situation. On 11 December 1967, MACV Directive 10-1 was published to more clearly define and delineate the functions and responsibilities of JUSPAO, MACPD, and MACCORDS. <sup>13/</sup>

In the field, difficulties were encountered in coordination between supporting flights and field units. Unwieldy lines of communications, vaguely defined responsibilities, and low psyops priorities created criticism of the adequacy and timeliness of Air Force support. <sup>14/</sup> Better communications and <sup>15/</sup> an increase in aircraft inventory have largely alleviated this problem. Central Targeting Centers are being established in each Corps Tactical Zone. All airborne psyops requirements are channeled to these centers, where they are reviewed, consolidated, approved, and assigned a priority. The requirements are forwarded weekly through channels to the supporting squadrons, whenever possible, a week in advance. Provision is made for updating requested missions until the day before the mission is scheduled. In addition, one aircraft in each flight is maintained on a standby status to take care of Quick Reaction requirements. <sup>16/</sup>

The timely exploitation of psyops opportunities on a tactical basis has been hampered by several factors. There have been long delays encountered in gaining access to defectors and prisoners in the hands of ARVN forces. <sup>17/</sup>

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Field representatives have been assigned who have inadequate training and are insufficiently experienced for psyops positions, and there has, at times, been a lack of adequate psyops resources. Such situations have been recognized and efforts are under way toward improvement. <sup>18/</sup>

In the in-country psyops program, the aircraft and personnel resources of the 14th ACW currently are being utilized on a continuing basis at very close to full capability. An increase in load or particular program emphasis could easily overextend the resources. To aid in alleviating this situation, the priority system was requested by the Air Force. This allows the assignment of available aircraft to the most pressing missions and, in addition, <sup>19/</sup> allows redeployment of aircraft to an area having high priority requirements.

An analysis was conducted by the 14th ACW to determine their capability for the support of a "maximum effort" to aid MACV in future planning. The 14th ACW has advised that 11 additional psyop sorties can be provided per day for three days with no subsequent reduction in daily support, or 11 additional psyop sorties per day for 10 days with a necessary reduction in support for <sup>20/</sup> one week following this, to perform maintenance to reconstitute the aircraft.

Operational problems have been encountered in the coordination of psyops missions with ground force activities. Of primary concern is the avoidance of artillery action and B-52 strikes. Clearance is always requested from the nearest control facility to the planned operations area; however, cases continue to be encountered where artillery action has been noted in an area stated as cleared. Better communication is being obtained between local field units and control centers and, frequently, a direct radio link has been

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obtained between psyops aircraft and local artillery units. <sup>21/</sup> A centralized flight control center has been recommended for each CTZ to help prevent psyops aircraft from flying into artillery fire or B-52 strikes. <sup>22/</sup>

The full potential of nighttime loudspeaker operations has not been realized due to aircraft limitations. Currently, the only aircraft that can perform such missions is the C-47, due to its navigation and weather instruments. Some difficulty is encountered with the C-47 due to high engine noise making it difficult to clearly hear the speaker broadcasts. This situation might be improved by installing a more powerful speaker system in the C-47, or improving the instruments and navigational gear in the O-2B. <sup>23/</sup>

The assignment of additional flying missions such as administrative flights, training missions, reconnaissance missions, flare missions, and others, to psyops squadrons places limitations on the resources available for psywar efforts. The rapid turnover of personnel has further complicated operational effectiveness by making it difficult to maintain personnel strength and proficiency. <sup>24/</sup>

The full potential of the speaker and leaflet distribution capabilities of the 56th ACW has not been realized in the out-country operations. Resources are available to support a much larger effort than is being tasked by the CAS. The current restriction on U-10 speaker operations could be improved by installing more powerful speaker systems such as those used in-country in the O-2B. <sup>25/</sup>

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### Leaflet Problems

Ground and antiaircraft fire have placed limitations on the altitude at which leaflet missions can be flown in-country. Although much research has been done on leaflet motion, accurate placement depends upon accurate knowledge of local winds. Forecasts are unreliable and winds usually must be determined on site by the aircraft accomplishing the mission. Even in this case, targets are missed. <sup>26/</sup> This problem is compounded in the out-country leaflet drops over North Vietnam. Due to heavy concentrations of antiaircraft and SAM sites in North Vietnam, the FRANTIC GOAT sorties are closely controlled and restricted as to operating area. This forces the use of high altitude leaflet drops, which depend upon the wind to drift the leaflets large distances into the target areas. For accurate prediction of the leaflet motion, the winds must be known at all altitudes all the way to the target. Again, forecasts are unreliable and the mission aircraft must either depend upon the forecast, or attempt to obtain the information upon reaching the site. Unfortunately, neither the F-4C nor the C-130 normally has sufficient fuel to perform this task. In addition, the wind patterns do not necessarily remain constant all the way to the target area. This has frequently resulted in leaflet motion being entirely different than predicated, and there have been large losses of leaflets. <sup>27/</sup>

As described in Chapter III, the performance of FRANTIC GOAT leaflet drops by C-130 aircraft requires that the crew work in oxygen masks at high altitude. Although the procedures have been designed to minimize physical effort, on more than one occasion, a crew member has had a physical reaction

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to the altitude. <sup>28/</sup>

### Speaker Problems

Loudspeaker operations have also been hampered by limitations imposed on altitude due to the danger of groundfire. In some cases, this has resulted in the volume being too low on the ground for the message to be heard. Less difficulty has been encountered with the O-2B, due to its higher speaker output. For this reason, replacement of the speaker systems in the U-10 and the C-47 would be desirable. <sup>29/</sup>

Complaints have been received, on occasion, regarding the speed at which speakers talk on tapes. Slower speakers are found to be more effective. In addition, wind can have an adverse effect on loudspeaker broadcasts. As the wind becomes stronger, the altitude must be lowered to insure the message reaches the target. If the wind exceeds 20 knots, broadcasts usually become ineffective. <sup>30/</sup>

### Problems of Logistics

The principal difficulty encountered with logistics has been in the shipment of leaflet materials. In the past, the primary method of shipment was by means of C-130 aircraft. This is an expensive mode of transportation and ties up a resource vitally needed for other activities. Recently, greater emphasis has been placed on surface shipment, especially of strategic materials. With careful planning, there is belief that 70 percent or more of the leaflets can be shipped by surface transportation. <sup>31/</sup>

From an operational consideration, it is desirable to store leaflet

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materials at central locations in each CTZ near the supporting squadrons. Much of the material previously has been stored locally and the aircraft has had to fly to the local area and make a stop to pick up the leaflets. With the leaflets stored near the base, they can be loaded on the aircraft at the beginning of the mission, and flown directly to the target area, eliminating, in many cases, an extra trip. This also eliminates an extra hazard, as many of the local strips are in marginal condition. <sup>32/</sup>

#### Morale Problems

Although high morale exists at the squadrons, several factors tend to detract from personnel job satisfaction. First, the results of psyops missions conducted by the pilots are difficult to assess and little feedback of information is provided them. It is difficult, therefore, for personnel to feel a sense of accomplishment commensurate with the dangers involved. The psyops missions have received a relatively low-priority rating which has made it difficult to obtain adequate equipment, facilities, personnel, and even aircraft parking space. This promotes a feeling of low-mission importance. In addition, a Category 3 mission rating has been given to psyops sorties as compared to Category 2 for strike aircraft and FACs. This is difficult for psyops personnel to accept, since psyops aircraft spend as much or more time over targets and frequently receive hits from groundfire. In several squadrons, it was observed that personnel involved in psyops and other combat missions, such as flare sorties, much preferred the alternate duties due to a greater sense of accomplishment. <sup>33/</sup>

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CHAPTER VI  
PSYOPS EFFECTIVENESS

Evaluation of the effectiveness of Psychological Operations is a difficult task and has been of concern to the U.S. administration since its early involvement. In 1965, the Honorable Carl T. Rowan reported to the President on psyops effectiveness. <sup>1/</sup> Rand Corporation conducted a study in 1965 for the Department of Defense concerning Viet Cong potential vulnerabilities to psywar operations. <sup>2/</sup> In 1967, Gen. William C. Westmoreland directed a study on psywar effectiveness be conducted. This was accomplished by a select group of experts, under the auspices of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). <sup>3/</sup> Unfortunately, the results of this study were considered of marginal usefulness. <sup>4/</sup> Finally, the Special Plans Division, J-5, of MACV was delegated the responsibility for biannually evaluating and reporting on the effectiveness of the psywar effort. This procedure has had a considerable impact on program effectiveness and the appraisals have been relied upon heavily in this report. <sup>5/</sup>

Meaningful measures of the success of psyops efforts are difficult to identify. Access to certain of the target groups such as NVA deserters and the people of North Vietnam can be achieved only indirectly. Interrogations of defectors, prisoners, and agents provide a valuable source of information from which insight can be gained on the success of the various psywar programs. The following section illustrates evidence of the success of psyops efforts.

## In-Country Operations

### Chieu Hoi

Perhaps one of the best overall indicators of the success of in-country operations is the monthly rate of "ralliers" obtained under the Chieu Hoi program. This program has had reasonable success, since its inception. A summary of the monthly number of ralliers or "Hoi Chanh" beginning in 1965 is given in Appendix V. <sup>6/</sup> These figures show a steady buildup of returnees from 1965, until a maximum rate of 5,557 was achieved immediately following Tet in 1967. This is commensurate with the gradual increase of emphasis on psyops during that period. An intensive psyops campaign was conducted in late 1966 and early 1967 based on the Tet season. The peak rate evidently reflects the pressure applied during this campaign. <sup>7/</sup>

The reduction in the Chieu Hoi rate after March 1967, can be attributed to several factors. During the summer and fall monsoon season, combat pressure was reduced on the enemy troops. More NVA troops were sent to South Vietnam to increase the force strength in preparation for the Tet Offensive conducted in 1968. This increased the concentration of NVA personnel in the enemy forces. More emphasis on countermeasures to allied propaganda created a closer control of personnel. Finally, the intensity of the preparation and indoctrination for the Tet Offensive bolstered the faith of the troops in the possibility of success in the war. <sup>8/</sup> The low point in the rate of ralliers in February and March 1968 corresponds to the peak in the Tet Offensive and the period immediately afterward. The returnee rate has risen subsequent to Tet, but has not returned to pre-Tet levels; this is

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perhaps due to a tendency to hold back and see how the peace talks progress  
in Paris. <sup>9/</sup>

The significance of the Chieu Hoi returnees can be interpreted in various fashions. As pointed out in the Introduction, one of the most impressive ways is to compare the total yearly returnee rate with that of total enemy killed in action. These figures are:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Returnees</u>	<u>Enemy KIA</u>
1965	11,123	35,436
1966	20,242	57,383
1967	27,178	90,023

As can be observed, the Chieu Hoi rate has been approximately one-third of the total enemy killed or, on the basis of a four-to-one kill ratio, it represents a potential saving of more than 14,000 allied lives over this three-year period. <sup>10/</sup>

The continuing success of the Chieu Hoi Program is further illustrated by the contents of a document captured in mid-1966. In the text of this document, concern was expressed over the success of the Chieu Hoi Program, and countermeasures for combating the program were delineated. Commissars were urged to take action against the campaign which it termed: "a wicked political and trick propaganda scheme". They recommended conducting trials for people who listened to loudspeaker broadcasts or picked up leaflets. In addition, they ordered that speaker aircraft be fired upon and attacks be made on Chieu Hoi Centers. <sup>11/</sup>

### NVA Campaign

The constant pressure and firepower of allied troops, the hunger and hardships associated with NVA life, the enemy's frequent conscription in the army, and his close family ties have produced an atmosphere in which the NVA soldier is vulnerable to psychological operations. <sup>12/</sup> With the attrition of Viet Cong troops and the buildup of NVA forces for the Tet Offensive, the number of NVA soldiers has become a much higher percentage of the enemy troops. In I CTZ, enemy forces are almost exclusively NVA. The NVA program, therefore, encompasses all Corps zones but is heaviest in I CTZ. <sup>13/</sup>

The effectiveness of the psyops effort against the infiltrators is reflected in the intelligence information regarding the number of NVA desertions. In 1966, this number was believed to have risen as high as 15 percent of the troops per month, based on information obtained from captured documents. <sup>14/</sup>

### General Operations

The effectiveness of airborne speaker operations was emphasized in 1965 by the Honorable Carl T. Rowan when he stated: <sup>15/</sup>

*"Many Province Chiefs say that the sustained use of such aircraft, with messages locally prepared for specific villages or Viet Cong units, are the most effective form of psychological warfare. In the Fourth Corps, I found evidence that a rise in the number of Viet Cong defectors was clearly and directly related to the occurrence of these loudspeaker missions."*

As time progressed, there was an increase in the attention and concern of the North Vietnamese leadership over the leaflet and loudspeaker operations.

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Intelligence reports in mid-1967 disclosed that specific instructions had been given by NFL leaders that cover up actions should be taken when loudspeakers were being operated. Troop leaders were ordered to sing, whistle, and shout to cover up the broadcasts. Instructions were given to advise troops that leaflets were poisonous; however, most returnees during this period had their pockets full of leaflets when they defected in spite of the warning. <sup>16/</sup> By the beginning of 1968, an even greater emphasis had been placed on combating psywar activities. In IV CTZ, the Viet Cong had been given specific directions to fire on psywar aircraft. The program was under-<sup>17/</sup> mining the ability of the VC to control the population.

Some of the most effective work has occurred in exploiting tactical situations. As an example, in Operation IRVING in 1966, a psyops aircraft north of Qui Nhon noted activity on an island off the coast. After an investigation was conducted, a surrender tape was played, and, a short time later, several VC troops came into the open with arms raised. The troops were picked up and transported by Army helicopter to a nearby camp. The psywar aircraft followed. One of the troops, a VC platoon leader, was induced to make a speaker tape which had the following text:

*"Attention: This is Nguyen Than Hang of Platoon B-28. I have rallied to the government and am being treated well. Give yourselves up. Put down your weapons and stand in the clear with your hands above your head. You will be treated well. Food and medicine will be given you. The government is winning. Give up before you are killed."*

The psywar aircraft returned to the island and played the tape until dark.

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In the next few days, 66 VC surrendered from that area. <sup>18/</sup>

Another mission in the same operation resulted in the surrender of 45 enemy troops. Elements of the 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, conducting a sweep operation of a hilly area, discovered a group of enemy troops hiding in a cave. All surrendered after repeated psywar broadcasts were performed over the area. <sup>19/</sup>

#### Out-Country Operations

##### FRANTIC GOAT

Evaluation of the leaflet operations in North Vietnam is complicated by the fear of the people to discuss issues openly. About 60 percent of the North Vietnamese people reside in the Red River Delta area in the North. This area also happens to be the most difficult to hit due to heavy concentrations of antiaircraft and SAM sites protecting Hanoi and Haiphong. <sup>20/</sup> Early success in the NVN operations was indicated by reports in 1966, that the residents of Hanoi eagerly sought leaflets in an attempt to gain an early warning of impending airstrikes, so they could leave the city in time. The bombing of Mu Gia Pass caused alarm and the suspicion that Hanoi was next. Indications were that there were even struggles between residents and the police for possession of the leaflets. <sup>21/</sup>

Ho Chi Minh publicly stated on 22 October 1966, his concern over the Allies psywar effort in NVN, and urged increased determination in combating the program. It was further noted that considerable effort was being made to gather up the leaflets as soon as possible. <sup>22/</sup>

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The NVN campaign was stepped up in 1967. By the end of the year, JUSPAO indicated that the goal of the NVN program would be to place approximately 60 million leaflets per month in North Vietnam, distributed according to population density. This goal was never achieved, primarily due to the lack of a psyops system which could penetrate safely the NVN defenses and distribute large volumes of leaflets. Moreover, the cessation of bombing in the North, and accompanying restrictions on sorties above the 20th Parallel have severely hampered the FRANTIC GOAT campaign. This places the majority of the people 23/ out of reach of leaflet operations.

#### TRAIL

Some degree of success has been achieved in the campaign against infiltrators moving along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. Reportedly, defections, desertions, feigned illnesses, and the like, account for as much as a 40-percent attrition in the NVA replacement units moving down from the North. In well-organized and trained units, this rate is probably too high. The most effective areas are immediately along the general infiltrations routes. Unfortunately, these areas also have high concentrations of anti-aircraft fire, which make them difficult to reach. The employment of BLINDBAT and CANDLE-STICK aircraft to drop leaflets at night has improved the access to these 24/ areas.

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## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSIONS

The current organization for formulation and direction of psywar programs appears to be intrinsically sound, although unwieldy. JUSPAO and the U.S. Embassy provide a close liaison with the GVN. Through MACCORDS and the civic actions programs in each CTZ, a broad local association is maintained with the people. Through the psyop battalions, association with the Field Forces, cognizance is maintained of the status of enemy forces. Inherently, these relationships provide a basis for identifying susceptibilities from which effective psyops programs can be formulated.

The major role of the USAF in Psychological Operations is the airborne support of national and local programs by means of loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops. Improvements in USAF effectiveness might be achieved by advancing the efficiency of resource utilization, bettering communications links with field forces, and increasing the capability of psyops aircraft. The USAF does not have broad enough contacts with the people or enemy forces to warrant extensive, independent participation in the formulation of psyops themes and materials. An exception is the assignment of trained officers to psyops positions in MACV or elsewhere, which improves the pool of experienced psyops officers in the USAF. This could later be advantageous to the USAF for situations where the major contact with the populace is made by them.

The support of the VNAF in Psychological Operations is about 10 percent of the USAF effort. This low level is due to inadequate equipment and an

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attitude of low-mission importance. The VNAF could assume a much larger role in psyops activities with a relatively small increase in resources. In fact, the airborne support of Psychological Operations is an area that could be taken over entirely by the VNAF with much less difficulty than the assumption of most other air support activities. An added advantage might be obtained because Vietnamese would be talking to Vietnamese.

An additional improvement in the in-country psyops support could be obtained by increasing the capabilities of the psyops aircraft for conducting night speaker missions. This could be achieved by increasing the speaker power in the C-47, and improving the navigation equipment and weather instruments in the other psyops aircraft. Reportedly, the night speaker missions have been particularly effective.

At the present time, resources are in existence for an expanded psyops program in Laos. The capabilities could be further improved by increasing the speaker power in the U-10 aircraft.

A marked improvement has been achieved over the last year in the liaison between psyop battalions and the supporting psyop squadrons. Coordination has been established at the local level, which has resulted in a better utilization of aircraft. A further improvement in operations might be achieved by using a centralized flight control center in each CTZ to coordinate psywar missions with other aircraft missions and ground artillery action.

The effectiveness of the NVN campaign has been significantly reduced by the restrictions on operations above the 20th Parallel. Prior to cessation,

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the requirements for missions to NVN were greater than USAF capabilities. This resulted in a request for the development of an improved psyops system, which could accurately distribute large quantities of leaflets into high-threat areas like the Red River Delta region. This development should be continued, not only as a contingency in the event operations in the North resume, but also to improve the USAF capability for performing similar psywar operations in North Korea, Communist China, or other locations.

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APPENDIX I

VNAF PSYOPS SUMMARY  
July 1966 to April 1968

Month	Sorties	Speaker Hrs	Leaflets
<u>1966</u>			
Jul	92	45	11,535,000
Aug	94	61	6,388,000
Sep	129	61	14,193,000
Oct	140	47	8,360,000
Nov	275	163	25,879,000
Dec	234	98	14,721,000
<u>1967</u>			
Jan	248	365	12,699,000
Feb	241	92	20,556,000
Mar	270	103	25,166,000
Apr	321	35	43,898,000
May	260	29	26,760,000
Jun	295	69	39,866,000
Jul	372	77.7	35,829,000
Aug	307	66.8	47,025,000
Sep	287	125.8	61,207,000
Oct	240	115	53,816,000
Nov	236	102	49,100,000
Dec	264	115	40,900,000
<u>1968</u>			
Jan	326	73	47,500,000
Feb	201	82	29,300,000
Mar	354	151	51,100,000
Apr	292	97	59,300,000

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VNAF Unit Psyops Sorties-1968

<u>Month</u>	110th	112th	114th	116th	716th
	<u>Da Nang</u>	<u>Bien Hoa</u>	<u>Nha Trang</u>	<u>Binh Thuy</u>	<u>TSN</u>
Jan	26	11	36	39	214
Feb	21	12	4	25	139
Mar	33	62	5	59	195
Apr	24	23	13	65	167
May	30	7	6	64	165

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APPENDIX II

PSYOPS STATISTICS

In-Country Leaflet Drops\*  
(In Thousands)

<u>1966</u>					
<u>Month</u>	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>Total</u>
JAN	35,280	32,290	32,357	49,035	148,962
FEB	4,645	5,828	11,898	9,594	31,965
MAR	9,020	4,598	13,101	9,616	36,335
APR	7,948	7,217	10,292	10,092	35,549
MAY	13,440	19,811	14,568	22,178	69,997
JUN	13,023	32,836	33,396	21,486	100,741
JUL	27,356	56,171	73,908	19,055	176,490
AUG	41,350	55,691	42,966	22,950	162,957
SEP	25,973	41,542	33,455	39,829	140,799
OCT	39,791	65,596	16,304	38,316	160,007
NOV	46,793	69,641	36,095	36,843	189,372
DEC	37,177	44,703	42,562	26,774	151,216
<u>1967</u>					
JAN	36,768	69,826	55,364	23,363	185,321
FEB	100,645	144,532	90,581	74,318	410,076
MAR	93,564	118,206	71,983	63,846	347,599
APR	81,546	163,677	69,549	72,974	387,746
MAY	109,038	189,452	72,858	63,244	434,592
JUN	94,263	131,318	101,446	73,783	400,810

\* Statistics include USAF and VNAF missions, the latter providing about 10 percent of the support.

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<u>Month</u>	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>Total</u>
JUL	100,292	212,235	133,245	61,228	507,000
AUG	187,818	193,365	176,581	80,077	637,841
SEP	169,524	165,986	161,985	100,445	597,940
OCT	148,557	145,864	271,469	77,776	643,666
NOV	232,436	201,172	187,591	78,362	699,561
DEC	155,509	168,572	160,417	70,033	554,531

1968

JAN	282,581	203,469	127,196	131,871	745,117
FEB	160,488	198,649	82,664	53,952	495,753
MAR	251,698	256,902	98,416	45,101	652,117
APR	202,000	169,380	152,276	82,881	606,537
MAY	23,445	147,018	121,512	141,638	433,613

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**LOUDSPEAKER AIR HOURS\***  
Jan 1966 - Dec 1967

<u>Month</u>	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>Total</u>
			<u>1966</u>		
JAN	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
FEB	90.5	121.3	167.0	183.2	562.0
MAR	133.7	139.3	396.6	100.7	770.0
APR	119.7	145.3	112.0	105.0	482.0
MAY	137.5	147.0	162.0	158.5	605.0
JUN	142.0	177.4	133.8	118.8	572.0
JUL	98.7	139.7	157.0	62.5	457.9
AUG	171.2	168.8	135.3	105.3	580.6
SEP	131.9	180.5	177.5	183.5	673.4
OCT	71.0	223.6	84.5	149.1	528.2
NOV	77.3	211.4	224.3	136.7	649.7
DEC	31.9	155.2	209.2	160.4	556.7
			<u>1967</u>		
JAN	98.3	155.9	350.8	201.5	806.5
FEB	168.4	354.6	277.3	149.8	950.1
MAR	165.9	348.8	298.0	183.1	995.8
APR	199.2	402.6	245.7	125.2	972.7
MAY	375.7	453.5	420.0	134.9	1,384.1
JUN	311.0	351.8	196.8	113.6	973.2

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<u>Month</u>	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>Total</u>
JUL	528.4	502.6	275.0	120.4	1,406.4
AUG	607.9	461.2	259.4	158.0	1,486.5
SEP	471.3	549.7	438.1	153.9	1,613.0
OCT	417.2	598.0	623.0	210.6	1,848.8
NOV	377.3	496.0	869.4	184.4	1,927.1
DEC	361.8	397	853.8	192.5	1,805.9

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IN-COUNTRY PSYOPS SORTIES\*

<u>Month</u>	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>Total</u>
			<u>1967</u>		
JAN	434	763	658	283	2,138
FEB	377	1,013	737	219	2,346
MAR	180	881	720	262	2,043
APR	466	940	781	296	2,483
MAY	676	897	862	334	2,769
JUN	552	796	747	312	2,407
JUL	698	1,134	900	286	3,018
AUG	827	1,147	871	362	3,207
SEP	604	1,186	976	420	3,186
OCT	450	1,098	1,116	712	3,376
NOV	594	1,411	1,196	1,201	4,402
DEC	548	1,108	1,819	686	4,161
			<u>1968</u>		
JAN	542	2,045	1,635	659	4,881
FEB	384	1,098	928	597	3,007
MAR	481	1,884	1,037	649	4,051
APR	523	1,044	1,028	698	3,293
MAY	573	967	1,021	698	3,259

\* Data unavailable by CTZ for 1966.

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APPENDIX III

FRANTIC GOAT LEAFLET DROPS  
(IN MILLIONS)

<u>Month</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
JAN	10.1	60.7	39.9
FEB	28.1	50.8	47.0
MAR	26.0	48.2	81.4
APR	41.0	64.0	47.6
MAY	38.7	43.5	54.1
JUN	40.1	42.7	72.1
JUL	42.0	50.2	-
AUG	45.4	52.0	-
SEP	44.7	46.9	-
OCT	28.8	49.2	-
NOV	63.7	43.0	-
DEC	53.9	51.0	-

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APPENDIX IV

TRAIL CAMPAIGN LEAFLET DROPS  
(IN MILLIONS)

<u>Month</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
JAN	3.3	22.3	28.6
FEB	8.5	15.3	27.3
MAR	12.0	10.9	27.2
APR	7.1	10.3	30.3
MAY	7.1	10.7	30.6
JUN	25.3	4.0	33.0
JUL	4.8	10.9	-
AUG	17.1	13.6	-
SEP	14.6	23.5	-
OCT	15.6	24.2	-
NOV	15.2	23.2	-
DEC	11.9	23.0	-

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APPENDIX V

CHIEU HOI RETURNEES

<u>Month</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Jan	406	1103	2272	1179
Feb	467	2082	2917	763
Mar	487	2336	5557	599
Apr	532	1510	2805	1060
May	1015	1494	2149	1039
Jun	1089	1314	2445	
Jul	687	1178	2253	
Aug	1571	1255	1742	
Sep	1068	894	1448	
Oct	1211	2062	1440	
Nov	1482	2505	1261	
Dec	<u>1106</u>	<u>2509</u>	<u>889</u>	
	11,123	20,242	27,178	

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## GLOSSARY

ACW	Air Commando Wing
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army of Republic of Vietnam
CTC	Central Targeting Center
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DOLS	Delayed Opening Leaflet System
FF	Field Force
FY	Fiscal Year
GPWD	General Political Welfare Department
GVN	Government of Vietnam
MACCORDS	Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
MACPD	Military Assistance Command Psychological Operations Directorate
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF	Marine Amphibious Force
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NVA	North Vietnamese
POLWAR	Political Warfare
Psyops	Psychological Operations
Psywar	Psychological Warfare
Recon	Reconnaissance
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TAW	Tactical Airlift Wing
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
USIA	U.S. Information Agency
USMACV	U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
VC	Viet Cong
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force